New york: No constitution enjoys perpetual legitimacy simply because it once commanded political acceptance. Constitutions endure because successive generations continue to recognize the authority they exercise, and the United Nations Charter is no exception. Although formally a multilateral treaty, it functions as the constitution of the contemporary international legal order, establishing the institutions of global governance, allocating authority among them, and entrusting the Security Council with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. According to TRTworld.com, there is a growing assumption that the Security Council continues to possess the constitutional legitimacy necessary to exercise a near-monopoly over the maintenance of international peace and security. For more than half a century, governments and scholars have debated how the Security Council should be reformed, proposing expansions in permanent membership, limiting the veto, strengthening regional representati on, and improving accountability. These proposals share a common premise: the belief that the constitutional settlement negotiated in San Francisco in 1945 continues to command the legitimacy required to govern a transformed international community. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long argued that "the world is bigger than five," emphasizing the need for the Security Council to reflect current geopolitical realities rather than the interests of its five permanent members. He contends that the current international system has struggled to respond effectively to conflicts, terrorism, pandemics, and other global crises, advocating for a more inclusive and just multilateral order. The real constitutional question lies deeper. Before considering how the Security Council should be reformed, the international community must first ask whether it continues to deserve the extraordinary constitutional authority it exercises. When the Charter was established, only fifty-one member states existed, with many regions u nder colonial rule or yet to achieve independence. The distribution of authority reflected in the Charter was not the product of constitutional principle but rather the political price demanded by the victorious powers of World War II for participating in the new organization. Constitutional legitimacy is not static, and assumptions about the political community governed by a constitution can change. International law recognizes that radically altered circumstances matter, allowing treaties to be reconsidered when foundational assumptions have shifted. The world of 1945 has disappeared, but the constitutional allocation of power from that era persists. The historical record shows repeated failures of the Security Council, from Rwanda to Syria, highlighting the need for structural change rather than isolated reform. The Charter's promises of collective security have increasingly delivered selective security, with major powers often prioritizing geopolitical interests over legal principles. The failure to imp lement a genuine system of collective security under Articles 43 through 47 has left the Security Council with extraordinary constitutional authority without the institutional framework expected by the Charter. The debate over Security Council reform has become a repetitive exercise, with those benefiting from the existing constitutional settlement holding the power to prevent meaningful change. As the international community considers the future, it must move beyond reform and establish a successor institution to the Security Council. This successor should be designed through an inclusive constitutional process reflecting the current international community, rather than the realities of 1945. Constitutional succession should not replicate the compromises of 1945. Instead, it should be built on principles of democratic legitimacy, representative participation, consistent application of the rule of law, meaningful accountability, and adaptability. These principles are not revolutionary but rather align with the standards by which legitimate governments are judged worldwide. The question facing the international community is no longer how to preserve the 1945 settlement but whether there is the constitutional imagination to build a successor institution capable of commanding legitimacy that every constitutional order must earn. The debate over Security Council reform has persisted for over half a century, yielding numerous proposals but little change. The time has come to consider whether the international community can construct a successor institution that genuinely represents and serves its needs.