rom Al-Qaeda to Lone Wolves and AI: How Terrorism Has Changed Since 9/11

Munich: Farhad N. was just a few months old when hijacked airliners were deliberately piloted into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, part of attacks on the United States that killed thousands of people. Twenty-five years later, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for plowing a Mini Cooper car into a crowd of people in Munich, killing two people and injuring dozens.

According to Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Farhad N.’s story underscores the evolving landscape of terrorism since 9/11, with both the terror threat and counterterrorism operations continually in flux. The 9/11 attacks were orchestrated by Al-Qaeda, led by Saudi millionaire Osama bin-Laden and sheltered by the Taliban in Kabul, who were subsequently driven from power. After this, Farhad N. grew up in a country where US-led international forces fought for 20 years to keep the Taliban at bay. He was among hundreds of thousands of Afghans who left their country seeking peace in Europe, only to become radicalized by online propaganda from imams in his native country. Without affiliation to any specific group, he acted on his own initiative, reflecting the emerging threat of lone actors inspired by multiple groups, as highlighted by a former US diplomat with decades of counterterrorism experience.

RFE/RL reports that advances in technology, including AI, drones, and social media, have created a more dangerous environment. Retired US General Joseph Votel noted the increasing online presence and influence of lone actors. Votel, who led a 2001 US troop assault on Taliban positions, emphasized the adaptation and sophistication of terrorist organizations, making the security environment more complex for experts.

Legacy terrorists like Al-Qaeda have survived through franchises such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia and JNIM in West Africa. This structure allowed Al-Qaeda to persist even after US military efforts destroyed its leadership and Afghan safe havens post-9/11. The new US Counterterrorism Strategy, released in May, identifies Al-Qaeda and AQAP as “legacy Islamist terrorists,” with a UN report describing AQAP as the “vanguard” of the global Al-Qaeda movement. Studies have shown how Al-Qaeda branches coordinate financing and training, with a $50-million ransom payment shared among various Al-Qaeda factions.

RFE/RL highlights that Al-Qaeda in Yemen significantly increased its propaganda after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, inciting lone wolf attacks in the West. However, counterterrorism capacity has diminished in the rapidly changing environment. A former diplomat noted the loss of personnel and resources, exacerbated by geopolitical challenges. Experts like Tom Sanderson and Bruce Hoffman have pointed out reduced focus and funding for counterterrorism, contributing to a staff exodus from the State Department’s counterterrorism bureau.

Despite these challenges, Jonathan Schroden from CNA noted a key policy shift in recent years towards managing threats away from the US homeland, rather than total defeat of terrorist groups. The US Counterterrorism Strategy criticizes the Intelligence Community for being stuck in old threat assessment methods, but Schroden believes the current US structure has been largely effective in managing threats over the past five to seven years.